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Abstract 
This paper analyses developments in regional security governance since 1945. It argues that regional 
organizations around the world have come to play increasingly important roles in security provision, 
often in conjunction with the United Nations whose charter makes ample allowance for such 
cooperation. It tracks the histories of regional organizations and considers points of similarity as well 
as difference. While acknowledging the important role of European institutions in encouraging 
regionalisms around the world, the paper’s principal focus in on non-European organizations, like the 
African Union, ASEAN or the Arab League. Three security arenas are explored in some detail: peace 
operations, non-proliferation and anti-terrorist measures. While far from exhaustive these three high 
profile security issues provide a good illustration of the robustness and resilience of security 
regionalism, its agenda setting capacity and its interface with evolving global security structures. 
Keywords 
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In January 2013 French forces intervened in Mali in an attempt to curb the growing influence of 
radical Islamic groups. This followed an announcement some months earlier that the United Nations 
Security Council had endorsed a mandate for the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) to send a mission to help restore government control to the north of the country. This was 
to be the latest in a number of peace operations conducted by the West African grouping over the past 
20 or so years: two earlier interventions that received much attention were those of Liberia and Sierra 
Leone.
1
 However, the Mali episode has highlighted an important emerging principle: that intervention 
by external forces in regional crises requires not only the appropriate UN mandate, but also the 
support of relevant regional institutions. 
The same principle had been highlighted in 2011 in nearby Arab countries of North Africa when 
the participation of regional institutions was sought to endorse international intervention in the crises 
arising from the Arab Spring. In what was seen an unprecedented development, the League of Arab 
States (LAS), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation 
(OIC), though not, in this case, the African Union (AU), played roles in supporting international 
intervention in Libya, as well mediating roles in Yemen and Syria. This was hailed by some as a new 
dawn for Arab organizations which had been previously classed as largely ineffective or ‘fossilized’.2 
Introduction: The new security realities of regionalism 
The roles played by African and Arab institutions in supporting international efforts to regulate 
conflict in West Africa and the Arab world were not isolated events. Rather they can be seen as part of 
a wider phenomenon in which regional institutions around the world have enjoyed increasingly higher 
profiles and are playing more significant roles in an emerging multilateral system, a role that since the 
end of the Cold War has been given increasing priority by the United Nations. Post-Cold War 
Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali acknowledged the potential importance of their hitherto 
neglected roles in his report Agenda for Peace which is rightly regarded as a landmark for the 
institution in laying out a framework for the expansion of its peacekeeping roles.
3
 In a subsequent 
report, Agenda for Democratization, he spoke of trends in new regionalism as a ‘healthy complement 
to internationalism’.4 His successor, Kofi Annan went further in claiming that ‘multilateral institutions 
and regional security organizations have never been more important than today.’5 Annan’s words 
reflected the reality both of growing involvement of regional institutions in peace and security and an 
increased determination on the part of the UN and other institutions to make better use of the 
provisions of the UN Charter, in particular Chapter VIII, which deals with the complementary 
relationship between the UN and regional institutions. Although the Iraq War of 2003, in which 
neither the United Nations nor regional organizations were involved, dealt an obvious blow to 
multilateralism, the controversy it generated, and its widely perceived failures, has placed renewed 
emphasis on the importance of multilateral action, backed up by the support of international 
institutions.
6
 
This new reality of regionalism has adjusted long-held assumptions about the United Nations as the 
prime global security provider and the perceived limitations of security regionalism, but also about 
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Europe and the North Atlantic area as the only homes of effective regionalism. For many years the 
European Community/Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had been 
regarded as the main cheerleaders and models for regional organizations, in the economic and security 
fields respectively. Even though both were acknowledged to be the product of a particular set of post-
war circumstances (and NATO itself was not designated as a Chapter VIII regional organization) and 
therefore unlikely to be replicated elsewhere, they were held up as examples becoming obligatory 
points of reference in any story of regionalism. Southern or ‘non-Western’ regionalisms, comprising 
mostly developing countries, were compared unfavourably, seen as providing inferior models and 
judged to have failed to achieve significant security or economic cooperation. This was unsurprising 
given the newness of most Southern states and the priority they accorded to state and nation building. 
Indeed the use of the word ‘non-West’ in relation to Southern states is used to capture the idea that 
such states had little input or say in early debates about regionalism whose parameters were set by the 
dominant powers in the international system thereby obscuring the possible importance of other modes 
of thought and practice.
7
 In the Cold War framework into which the first regional institutions emerged, 
organizations like the League of Arab States, or later the Organization of African Unity were seen to 
provide only modest services, with only distant prospects of achieving an significant level of either 
economic or security cooperation.
8
  
By the late 1980s, however, as the Cold War drew to a close, the world of regionalism started to 
change quite quickly with the greater empowerment of regions and regional actors and the greater 
expectations placed on international institutions. This was the start of regionalism’s new wave.9 
First,the European Community itself, in responding to internal and external challenges for change, 
significantly enhanced its own capabilities and through the European Political Cooperation (EPC) 
process expanded its remit and competencies into the political and security arena. The European 
Security Strategy (ESS), adopted in 2003, demonstrated how far Europe had moved beyond earlier 
understanding of its original roles and revealed the EU’s aspirations as a security actor in its own right, 
but also as an integral part of a new multilateral architecture incorporating a ‘stronger international 
society, well-functioning international institutions and a rule based international order’.10 
Second, outside Europe, there was a proliferation of other regionalisms. This new regional-level 
activity was reflected in the growth in numbers but also the capacity of regional organizations and in 
the new opportunities provided for regionalism in an evolving system of global governance. Indeed 
the European Security Strategy document explicitly mentions non-European organizations like the 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Southern Cone Common Market 
(MERCOSUR) and the African Union (AU) as making important contributions to international 
order.
11
 Regional organizations around the world, even those seen to have been previously lacking the 
necessary qualities for economic integration, started to move into the security arena in response to new 
demands. In the case of ECOWAS, noted above, it was revisions to the founding treaty in 1993 that 
charged the organization with the responsibility of preventing and settling regional conflicts.
12
 In the 
case of the League of Arab States, an extraordinary council session in Cairo in March 2011 endorsed a 
call for international intervention to impose a no-fly zone in Libya to protect civilians from regime 
violence. However, as noted above, the role of regionalism in the Arab Spring and in West Africa was 
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just part of a much bigger and longer wave in which regional organizations around the world have 
become more assertive in formulating responses to new and old security challenges. Whether in 
Africa, Latin America or most recently in East Asia, institutions have supported initiatives to promote 
regional solutions to regional security issues. A characteristic of such initiatives, as discussed later in 
this paper, is not only that they allow regions and regional actors to craft and implement their own 
policies and preferences - to actively shape regional debates – but that they provide a clear link to 
global institutions and policies. There is therefore to contemporary regionalism an important 
multilateral framework, which provides a unifying point of reference, alongside a set of sometimes 
overlapping, sometimes distinctive regional ones.  
Though Europe casts a long shadow on regionalism – with the EU in particular influencing 
institutional design - and European specialists continue to focus on Europe as model and flagship, 
there has been increasing interest in and recognition of non-European regionalisms and the 
experiences and lessons they offer, demonstrating that there is far more to regionalism that Europe.
13
 
The relevance and possibilities of non-European regionalisms has been brought further into focus at a 
time when Europe itself is struggling with the consequences of expansion amid a widespread and 
protracted economic crisis whose proportions threaten to weaken some of its own instruments. 
Southern regionalisms have not fallen victim to the effects of global crisis: their levels of integration 
were shallower; their projects less ambitious. Indeed they have arguably benefited from them: both in 
Latin America and East Asia regional institutions were strengthened by the perceived failure of 
multilateral institutions in earlier financial crises in the 1990s.
14
 The focus of this paper is not 
regionalism’s response to global crises as such, though this subject has attracted recent attention, 15 but 
rather how regional organizations of the ‘second (post-Cold War) wave’ have reacted to new security 
opportunities and challenges and with which implications for international order.
 16
 More generally it 
aims to explore their diverse roles and meanings in an emerging multilateral order. 
In what follows, I chart briefly the evolution of some non-European regionalisms demonstrating 
how, in trying to compare regionalisms today, it is important to study their parallel and distinctive, if 
often neglected, histories since these set institutional pathways and have provided the foundations for 
later developments and organizational structures. We cannot evaluate, for example, recent changes in 
ASEAN structures, without also understanding the region’s past and initial commitment to low 
common denominator, consensus-based regionalism and minimal institutionalism. I then turn to look 
the more recent growth of regionalism in the security field to show how, despite the resource and 
coordination problems, the issues raised for sovereignty-loving states and the limitations imposed by a 
competitive multilateral framework, there has been a sustained growth in what has rightly been 
dubbed the ‘global politics’ and practice of regionalism.17 This paper commenced by drawing attention 
to the contemporary cases of Africa and the Middle East; however these are just two examples. 
Indeed, as argued by a number of authors, the Middle East region, with its high levels of conflict and 
external penetration, has rarely been seen at the forefront of regionalism.
18
 Latin America and East 
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Asia are two other cases that have attracted considerable attention: the first because of its long-
standing interest in and almost continuous development of regional institutions dating back to 
independence in the early nineteenth century;
19
 the second because of the relative lack of such history 
matched by enormous contemporary interest and the fast growth in the numbers of regional 
organization.
20
 While considering these contrasting cases, I look more generally at some wider trends 
in regionalism to highlight some common and diverging features and assess the significance in 
particular of regionalism’s latest wave in security affairs. 
It should be noted that security is neither the only nor the most obvious place to test new 
regionalism. Though early experiments in regional integration like the European Community had 
strong security logic, most models of regional integration prioritised economics and trade and were 
sceptical of regionalism’s ability to embrace the security domain with its high politics agenda; any 
security cooperation involving a compromise of sovereignty was widely regarded as requiring higher, 
even unattainable levels of integration. It is certainly true that if measured in terms of a transfer of 
state authority to supranational institutions, security integration has not occurred. Security cooperation, 
however, on a wide spectrum from low-level confidence building measures to the pluralistic security 
community described by Karl Deutsch has taken place in different settings and these provide a useful 
laboratory for exploring regional competencies and testing assumptions about emerging trends in 
multilateralism supported by the UN and other international institutions.
21
 Security regionalism does 
not therefore imply the integration of previously disparate parts or the devolution of authority to supra-
national institutions. It can be best understood as a process whereby regional actors agreed to 
collaborate and cooperate on a range of measures that contribute to an improved security environment. 
Parallel and contrasting regional histories 
There is a strong argument to be made that understanding contemporary regionalism requires 
historically grounded analysis since it is only by studying different regional trajectories that we can 
appreciate the constraints and opportunities that different regions have faced.
22
 Europe’s ambitious 
experiment in regional integration after 1945 cannot be understood without reference to previous 
incentives to cooperation: the experience of two world wars and the onset of the Cold War; South East 
Asia’s later-onset and more limited experiment reflects the impact of another war, Vietnam, but was 
also respectful of the longstanding and unresolved rivalries and tensions that marked the region’s 
history in the first half of the twentieth century. As the timing of the above cases indicates, the growth 
of regionalism understood as state-led activity leading to formal regional organization dates mostly 
from the Second World War and this period has been the main focus of studies on regionalism. 
However, there are significant prior histories of both regional ideas and institutions to draw upon in 
Europe and elsewhere. For example, the foundation of the League of Arab States in 1945 reflected the 
growth of an Arab consciousness arising from the late Ottoman period, one which continued to 
develop alongside an emerging, externally crafted state system and was reflected in attempts to 
promote Arab institutions and congresses, which were to be important precursors to later organization. 
Discussions leading to the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 similarly 
drew upon pan-African debates which were informed by challenges to the logic of colonial state 
building practice. More than a century earlier the Spanish Americas had developed their own 
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distinctive perspectives of their region, based upon history, geography and culture, but also notions of 
recognition and respect for their newly won independent statehood and solidarity against colonial 
incursions. An important body of Latin American international law grew out of this movement. 
Towards the late 19
th
 century, Spanish American thinking merged with wider streams of Pan-
American thought marking US input and ascendancy that would be reflected in the early development 
of inter-American institutions and later the Organization of American States (OAS). But in all the 
above cases, the presence of pan-, or continental ideas about regionalism competed or coexisted with 
evolving institutional structures, informing their progress and development. 
Such early histories notwithstanding, the post-1945 starting point for a comparative study 
ofregionalism is both justified and compelling because of the relative novelty of formal institutions, 
the expansion of international society following decolonization, making possible a proliferation of 
state-based regional organizations in a variety of different regional settings, and perhaps most 
important, the first serious attempt to lay out the parameters for the relationship between regional and 
‘universal’ institutions as expressed in the Charter of the United Nations. Since regional organizations 
are treaty and charter-based, making explicit reference to the UN Charter, it follows that any 
understanding the evolution of regionalism in the security sphere necessitates a parallel understanding 
of this relationship. 
Following discussions at the founding conference in San Francisco in 1945, the final version of the 
UN’s charter reflected the understanding that states would seek to conduct their economic, political 
and security affairs within defined regional contexts. Not only the charter but the internal organization 
of the United Nations itself clearly reflects this with the establishment of regional economic 
commissions and voting procedures. The Economic Commission on Latin America (ECLA, later 
ECLAC to include the Caribbean) is an example of one such commission, mandated to promote 
economic and social development through regional cooperation.
23
 The relationship between the UN 
and regional agencies is outlined in different sections of the UN charter, but the most important 
provisions are found in Chapter VIII, articles 51-54, which accords regional arrangements a formal 
role in peace and security under the authority of the United Nations Security Council. Though the 
Charter is ambiguous regarding which type of regional agencies are appropriate for Chapter VIII 
partnerships (reflecting a wider and much debated ambiguity in the definition and nature of 
regionalism itself
24
), leaving this open to different interpretations, the stage was set for future, if not 
immediate, collaboration between the UN and a variety of regional organizations.
25
  
In the short term, it is unsurprising that this did not happen: of the early post-war regionalisms 
whether security (like NATO or the Central Treaty Organization,CENTO), economic (EC or NAFTA) 
or multi-purpose institutions (LAS, AU, OAS), only few Western institutions were judged as 
successes or able to fulfil charter expectation. In a Cold War environment, reflected in a divided, veto-
wielding Security Council, the envisaged relationship between the UN and regional organizations 
could hardly materialise. Security was delivered regionally, by the actors on either sides of the East-
West divide, but outside the UN framework, by the United Sates and the Soviet Union through their 
respective alliance systems and institutions: NATO and the Warsaw Pact. However the unifying legal 
framework provided by the UN proved to be important for later developments. And there were some 
successes for regional organizations in terms of promoting the idea of unity and cooperation around 
core issues like decolonization and apartheid in the case of the OAU or Palestine in the case of the 
Arab League. Early peacekeeping activities were also carried out by the OAU, OAS and LAS in 
conflicts in Chad (1981), the Dominican Republic (1965) and Kuwait (1961) for example. Above all, 
these were formative years for international institutions with lessons, not only in economic but also 
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security integration alongside institution building and a developing sense of community. There were 
few organizations that disappeared: a Cold War security organization like CENTO, which failed to 
gain legitimacy among its members, was the exception. Rather, the new regional organizations of the 
post-war era learned to adapt survive and develop amid changing patterns of regional and global 
security in which they themselves were becoming more important players.  
If the early decades of the Cold War revealed a mixed balance sheet in terms of the capacity and 
performance of regional organization, there were already some changes underway even before the end 
of the Cold War which suggested a new turn for regionalism. There was a new phase of institution 
building, mainly in the 1970s, in which regional actors, particularly in the developing world, started to 
develop a new repertoire for dealing with regional issues. Much of the activity was sub-regional rather 
than continental, though two wider trans-regional projects, the Conference of Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, later OSCE) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) 
also emerged in this period, both of which were important in fostering a wider European and Islamic 
identity respectively. The earlier case of ASEAN has already been noted, but this was also the period 
in which the Caribbean Community (CARICOM - 1973), ECOWAS (1975), the South African 
Development Committee (SADC - 1980) and the GCC (1981), SARC (South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation - 1985) were also established. All had evident security rationales and suggested 
a degree of greater independence from the still dominant Cold War theatre, though this was far from 
complete. The GCC is one such example. Though the language of its charter is couched in more 
neutral economic and cultural language the organization was motivated by the common set of security 
concerns which faced the vulnerable Gulf monarchies in the light of the Iranian Revolution (1978-79) 
and the ensuing Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). If the containment of Iran partly informed the early 
rationale of the GCC, the short-lived Arab Cooperation Council with its emphasis on the economic 
integration of its four members (Egypt, Jordan, Iraq and the Yemen Arab Republic), was also seen as a 
vehicle for the containment of Iraq. The organization quickly fragmented after Iraq’s intervention in 
Kuwait in 1990. A similar logic informed SADC in respect of its relations with South Africa,  
Retrospectively, rather than being seen as a desert for non-European regionalisms, the Cold War 
period should be viewed as one of selective if limited growth and consolidation. The novel features of 
regionalism, its multidimensionality and its relationship, if hitherto underutilised, with the United 
Nations have been noted as has the increased assertiveness of some regional actors. Both these 
features would come more fully into play as the new post-Cold War order gradually took shape. At the 
end of the Cold War, however, two apparently contradictory features emerged in which old debates 
about universalism and regionalism reappeared amid speculation as to what kind of ‘new world order’ 
(the term was popularised by US President George HW Bush) would be feasible. There were hopes, 
lifted after some modest successes in conflict resolution – in Cambodia, Mozambique and El Salvador 
for example - and the experience of the Gulf War of 1991 in restraining Iraq’s ambitions in Kuwait, 
that the UN would finally be able to function as their founders intended. Such hopes and continuing 
scepticism about regionalism’s ability to deliver peace and security because of possible competition 
with, or undermining of the UN’s efforts, or the inherent bias of regional actors, acted as a continuing 
brake on impulses to regionalism.
26
 
Such concerns were soon overshadowed by events. The renewed possibilities of regionalism 
(which had already been expressed in the ambition of the European project, but also in building 
regional capacity elsewhere) plus the obvious limitations of the UN, under-empowered and resourced, 
yet faced with a multiplicity of global crises, meant that power and logic of the regional project was 
quick to reassert itself. Indeed, it was the overextension and evident limitations of the United Nations 
faced with a series of crises in Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, for example, and the 
preventative action taken by regional organizations, that helped to placed renewed emphasis on the 
effective use of Chapter VIII provision in respect of a quickly expanding arena of peace operations. 
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Words like ‘sub-contracting’ and ‘subsidiarity’ entered the vocabulary of cooperation.27 In 2000, after 
a challenging peacekeeping decade, a UN panel chaired by Lakhdar Brahmi was tasked with a 
comprehensive review of peace operations which was followed up by the High Level Panel on Threats 
Challenges and Change. In placing renewed emphasis on the importance of effective partnerships, the 
Panel’s report frankly acknowledged that the Security Council had hitherto underutilised the ‘potential 
advantages’ of working with regional organizations and that the UN had much to learn from them in 
terms of standard-setting and guiding preventative action. Enhancing the role of regional organizations 
was identified as one of four pillars in global security architecture; importantly it was also seen as a 
way of closing the North-South divide in term of security provision.
28
 Secretary General Boutros Ghali 
also initiated a series of regular meetings with the heads of major regional organizations to discuss 
meant to further cooperation. All these developments represented an acknowledgement of a growing 
reality and a change of culture on the part of the United Nations. It was also a further step in the 
direction of achieving a more coherent and integrated UN system.
29
 
The legitimacy afforded by the UN to regional organizations had particular reference to a series of 
crises in post-Cold War Europe and on the African sub-continent, but it was linked to a much wider 
set of post-Cold War security challenges which involved a range of different institutions. As in 
previous waves of regionalism, Europe was close to the centre of the project of regional revival, 
through its ambitious Maastricht Treaty agenda and its embrace of security and defence as new 
priorities, leading to the development of the European Security Strategy at outlined at the start of the 
paper. But the development of European institutions was only one aspect of a much bigger process, 
loosely dubbed ‘new regionalism’ which saw both greater empowerment and action by a range of 
regional actors in many different arenas including security.
30
 This process saw the birth of a number of 
new organizations including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). A number of older organizations also expanded their 
memberships or took on new tasks and activities. Not all, like the Asia Pacific Economic Conference 
(APEC), had an explicit security focus. But in providing a wider setting for dialogue and consensus 
building such institutions all impacted on security governance in different ways. The ARF, for 
example, and another new grouping, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO - 2001), which 
grew out of the Shanghai Five saw China’s entry into regional security arrangements for the first time.  
As described above, this new regional wave had multiple features and has been subject to 
numerous assessments by scholars and policy makers.
31
 A few of its most important aspects may be 
briefly summarised here. First, there has been sustained evidence of quantitative change with regard to 
numbers of institutions, institutional memberships and spheres of activity. These developments are 
tracked and recorded by the UN University’s Centre for Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS), a 
centre founded in 2001 whose existence and expanding arena of activity marks the importance 
attached to the study of contemporary regionalism.
32
 Second, significant qualitative changes have both 
led and followed this expansion, with constitutional arrangements adjusted to accommodate new 
spheres of activity. In this regard, African institutions under the umbrella of the reformed OAU which 
was renamed the African Union (AU) in 2001 are exemplary. Drawing on European institutional 
design, new features include a pan-African Parliament and Court of Justice, but with other elements 
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(part of an emerging African Peace and Security Architecture
33
) designed to meet the security 
challenges facing African states in the twenty first century. For example, embodied in the revised 
Constitutive Act, in article 4(h), is a version of the principle, ‘Responsibility to Protect’; which 
permits, under certain conditions, humanitarian intervention by African states in African crises.
 34
 It is 
noteworthy that this development took place some five years prior to its final adoption by the United 
Nations as recorded in the World Summit Outcome Document of 2005. Both SADC and ECOWAS 
and two other African institutions the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa 
(CEMAC) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have undergone 
restructuring including upgrades to their existing security provision; all have been active in regional 
peace operations. 
If African (and European) institutions stand out as exceptional in the development of security 
features to address regional crises, and filling gaps in global security provision, there have been 
similar, if lower profile developments elsewhere. East Asia, viewed as a region where the processes of 
regionalization were historically underdeveloped and effective regional institutions have been slower 
to emerge,
35
 has been increasingly identified with new regional activity and a more positive view of 
collective action and problem solving at the local level.
36
 ASEAN has been named as the most 
effective regional institution among developing countries. And the ASEAN Charter (2008) has been 
described as a significant ‘constitutional moment’ for the institution proving the legal basis for the 
possibility of greater economic and security cooperation in the region.
37
 The ARF group numbers 25 
states including China, Russia, Japan, the EU and the USA, giving substance to the idea of a broader 
multilateral forum in Asia.  
Latin America has also seen institutional developments in the expansion of Mercosur’s remit in 
1998 and in the Interamerican Democratic Charter (2001) both of which reflect new security concerns 
in the endorsement of democracy consolidation. Three newer organizations, the Union of South 
American Nations (UNASUR – 2008), the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA - 2004), 
and Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC 2010) offer contrasting visions of 
regional order, each with an explicit, if distinctive, regional security focus. Since 2011 regional 
organizations in the Middle East have been more active, supporting more interventionist policies in 
response to the events of the Arab Spring as noted at the start of the paper. While the Arab League’s 
constitutional arrangements remain unchanged, its support for intervention in Libya was 
unprecedented as was the GCC’s controversial military intervention in Bahrain. The further 
consolidation of the GCC as a regional security institution was marked by plans for its possible 
expansion –hitherto unrealized- to include the monarchies of Jordan and Morocco and the Saudi 
monarch’s announcement, at the end of 2011, of proposals for institutional deepening, of moving the 
organization from ‘cooperation to union’.38  
While the above account of the incremental growth, increased relevance and legitimacy of 
regionalism has pointed to some positive developments and regionalism’s evolving if uneven 
contribution to the emergence of a more effective multilateral system, the picture is more complex and 
controversial than this overview allows. First, many regionalisms are severely constrained and not all 
                                                     
33
 See further, Alex Vines, ‘A decade of African Peace and Security Architecture’, International Affairs 89/1 (January 
2013), pp. 89-109. 
34
 http://www.au.int/en/about/constitutive_act. See paragraphs 138-9. 
35
 J.G. Ruggie, World Polity, p. 103; Christopher Hemmer and Peter Katzenstein, ‘Why is there no NATO in Asia? 
Collective Identity Regionalism and the Origins of Multilateralism’, International Organization 56/3 (2002) pp. 575-607. 
36
 See Mark Beeson, Regionalism and Globalization in East Asia, (London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
37
 Simon Tay, ‘The ASEAN Charter. Between National Sovereignty and the Region’s Constitutional Moment’, Singapore 
Yearbook of International Law (2008), p. 152. 
38
 ‘Gulf Leaders to Discuss GCC Union’, Al-Jazeera 14 May 2012, see 
 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/05/201251421825606952.html 
Security regionalisms: lessons from around the world 
9 
world regions have participated fully in this newer wave. Latin America’s overlapping and competing 
regional structures lack overarching coherence.
39
 Deep regional rivalries and the predominance of 
India in the South Asia region, for example, mean that an institution like SAARC has only limited 
powers. In other regions the presence of dominant states, hegemons, can have positive, but also 
negative effects on regional processes. Regional organizations do not always act in accordance with 
UN charter provision, despite flexibility of interpretation and the cases of NATO (in the former 
Yugoslavia) and ECOWAS (in Liberia) in the 1990s provide illustrations of this. Finally, as evidenced 
by the Iraq War of 2003 in particular (and in contrast to the Gulf War of 1991), states may choose to 
ignore both the United Nations and relevant regional organizations in undertaking military operations. 
Notwithstanding such critiques and the further observation that regional institutions may shift the 
burden of responsibility for peace operations away from the United Nations with possibly detrimental 
results,
40
the overall balance sheet remains one of regional growth and development, more efficient 
institutions and better coordination and burden-sharing with the UN. One aim of the 2006 High Level 
Panel on UN System-Wide Coherence was precisely to make recommendations on streamlining the 
UN’s relationships with regions and regional structures to promote a ‘more coherent regional 
institutional landscape’.41 Such coherence has been visible in the partnerships established between the 
European Union and the UN,
 42
 or the AU and the UN as demonstrated in joint peace-keeping missions 
like that of Darfur, which commenced in 2008; or most recently in the coordination between Arab 
institutions and the UN in respect of the Arab uprisings. At another level coordination between 
different regions themselves, has been promoted by the policies of ‘inter-regionalism’ – the Asia-
Europe meeting (ASEM) is one example.
43
 
In the final section, I illustrate some of these points further by looking selectively at some examples 
of how regional institutions have responded to recent threats and challenges and with what 
consequences for the United Nations and the multilateral security architecture. 
Contemporary regionalisms: further considerations 
One measure of regionalism’s contemporary success and significance is to be found in considering the 
range and diversity of its activities, a characteristic of ‘new regionalism’; another is in its acceptance 
by the UN and other multilateral institutions like the WTO. This paper has focused on the security 
domain, but there is a parallel and related story to be told by examining the performance of regional 
institutions in the field of political economy.
44
 The success of security regionalism reflects its ability to 
keep pace with and respond to contemporary global threats; to mark out the regional security terrain as 
well as provide appropriate responses. Security today is seen as encompassing a wide range of threats: 
both the more traditional threats of military conflict and war as well as a range of newer economic and 
social threats, relating poverty, refugee disease, environmental degradation and so on.
45
 The 
contemporary security scene is also populated with an increasing number of actors including UN 
bodies, regional organizations, non-governmental organizations and ad hoc groups. Some of the ways 
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that regional organizations have contributed to security agendas and debates have already been 
highlighted, but this section will focus on three areas in particular: peace operations, nuclear non-
proliferation and anti-terrorist measures all of which feature predominantly on the UN’s security 
agenda and in the European Security Strategy.
 46
 
The first of these areas, which is wide-ranging in scope, is that of peace operations. Peace 
operations have stretched the earlier concept of peace keeping to include a greatly expanded range of 
activities in which military, police and civilian personnel are involved in delivering security, political 
and early peace-building support.
47
 As already indicated in this paper regional actors, both formal but 
also informal groups and coalitions have been increasingly involved in a variety of peace operations, 
either acting independently or in conjunction with the UN, offering a contrast to the relatively 
restricted roles played in the earlier Cold War years. The Centre on International Cooperation (CIC) 
now reports annually on global peace operations, offering extensive quantitative and qualitative 
analysis on their status and nature.
48
 Though the numbers of such operations, and the balance between 
UN and non-UN operations, has fluctuated over the last decade there has been an overall pattern of 
sustained growth of peace operations, with significant regional participation. In 2010-2011, for 
example, nearly half of all global peacekeeping operations and civilian missions were carried out by 
regional organizations.
49
 The range of such missions is wide: from enforcement missions like those of 
NATO in Afghanistan or Libya, to election monitoring by the Organization of American States (OAS) 
in Haiti, or institution building missions like those of the EU or Organization of Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Bosnia Herzegovina. Though there has been controversy attached to 
the involvement of regional actors in peace operations for reasons already alluded to including the 
usurping of the Security Council’s authority (as in the case of the former Yugoslavia, overlapping 
competencies, capacity limitations (in Africa) and the role of regional hegemons in various settings 
(like Russia in the CIS), peace operations provide a good indicator of their emerging roles in 
multilateral security governance. 
The second area is the recent (re-)securitisation of issues like global terrorism and the spread of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). These have been prioritised since an intensification of 
international terrorist attacks after 9/11 - mostly against Western targets - and the aspirations of 
‘rogue’ states like Iran and North Korea to nuclear status. Both have posed new regional security 
challenges as well as opportunities for collaboration with the UN and other bodies and as such have 
been addressed by a range of regional institutions. The case of WMD is interesting since this has long 
been the domain of multilateral treaties, the centrepiece being the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 
which came into effect in 1970. However, ‘international’ organizations are invited to play a role in 
encouraging adherence to treaty provisions and Article VII states that: ‘Nothing in this Treaty affects 
the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of 
nuclear weapons in their respective territories.’50 As in the case of peace operations, a number of 
regional actors have entered the field of nuclear weapons non-proliferation both through the 
negotiation of both formal treaties and more informal arrangements. In 1967, prior to the signature of 
the NPT, twenty-four Latin American countries signed the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty 
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at Tlatelolco, making Latin America then the ‘sole continent free from nuclear war competition.’51 The 
Bangkok Treaty signed at ASEAN’s summit in 1995 established a moratorium on the production of 
nuclear weapons between member states making South East Asia a nuclear weapons free zone. The 
Pelindaba Treaty (2009) established a nuclear weapons free zone in Africa. In 2010 a Review 
Conference of the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) further endorsed the roles of all 
regional groups in concluding nuclear-weapon-free zones including the three regions named above and 
the Antarctic, South Pacific, Central Asia.
52
 In addition to formal treaties there have been a variety of 
informal arrangements, like the Six-Party Talks and the Proliferation Security Initiative or the EU-3 
designed to kerb the nuclear aspirations of states like North Korea and Iran respectively under the 
umbrella of the NPT.  
If the UN has provided leadership in respect of the non-proliferation debate, it has for different 
reasons, been slower to adopt a common position on terrorism.
53
 Definitions of what constitutes 
terrorism are highly subjective and much contested, but it has evidently become a predominant 
security issue of the 21
st
 century. Unlike peacekeeping operations and WMD, the UN had not, at least 
until 2006, with the adoption of a Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, embraced a common framework 
in respect of terrorist threats.
54
 Though the strategy calls for a holistic approach to counter-terrorism it 
relies on member states for implementation and endorses the contributions of different stakeholders 
including regional organizations.
55
 While a number of regional groups have moved to endorse the UN 
initiative, regional responses have varied, reflecting the situation of the region, its exposure to threats, 
the institutional framework and capacity. Indeed, long before the adoption of the UN strategy, a 
number of well-established institutions already had existing provision to deal with longstanding threats 
to members, including NATO, the OAS, the EU, MERCOSUR and the OAU. Many of these 
institutions then moved to upgrade their provision in the light of new threats post 9/11. For example 
the OAS and MERCOSUR created the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism and Terrorism 
Working Group respectively. The African Union adopted an additional protocol aimed to prevent and 
combat terrorist activity in the region; the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) incorporates a 
Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure based in Tashkent. Despite the evident difficulties in articulating a 
common position, a history of proliferation of differing regional initiatives and the continuing 
propensity of states to deal with terrorism mini- rather than multi-laterally, the UN strategy and 
increasing collaboration with regional organizations provides further evidence of efforts to construct a 
more unified system of global security governance even in the most highly contentious security areas.  
Conclusion: common and diverging logics of security regionalism 
The three arenas described above do not, of course, exhaust the extensive repertoire of security 
activity of different regional organization. One could, for example, extend the discussion to cross-
border crime or environmental and health challenges like haze pollution in South East Asia or 
HIV/AIDS and SARS in Africa and South East Asia, both of which have been addressed, albeit 
imperfectly, by relevant regional groups.
56
 However, these three high profile security questions do 
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provide an effective illustration of the robustness and resilience of security regionalism, its agenda 
setting capacity and its increasing interface with evolving global security structures.  
What are the broader lessons that emerge from this comparative survey of regionalism in the 
security field for scholars and policy makers? One the one hand it has been suggested, alongside the 
findings of other writers, that there are common logics in terms of how states seek to address 
collective security challenges.
57
 Regionalism is one such logic for it provides a framework in which 
regional actors can communicate common concerns, share knowledge and expertise and coordinate 
actions. On the other hand, it is also true that different regions understand and respond to threats and 
opportunities in different ways – often based on past experience - and this leaves room for a diversity 
of interpretation and practice. There are multiple and sometimes competing Asian, Latin American 
and African ways of regionalism. Put simply, ideas about regions and how, and on what principles 
they should be organized differ. A further consideration about the limits and opportunities of 
regionalism lies in the nature of regime types, regional rivalries and extent of external penetration of 
any given region. Though beyond the scope of this paper, a study of authoritarian regimes, for 
example, suggests that they are less likely to make any compromises with sovereignty or to endorse 
efforts at deeper cooperation and integration which might challenge or weaken their authority at home 
and abroad. For such regimes regionalism may provide a useful rhetorical tool. Further, regions with 
serious on-going rivalries and those that have been deeply penetrated by external powers, like the 
Middle East, have been slow to regionalise or, like Latin America, throw up competing regionalisms 
in an effort to balance against or bandwagon with the external hegemon (the United States). On the 
other hand post-conflict regions or regions where superpower overlay has been removed or loosened 
have been able to achieve different degrees of cooperation. However, as argued here, one important 
strand uniting regionalisms, particularly in the security domain, is the common point of reference and 
legitimacy provided by the UN charter. Although the significance of this link has been under-
recognised, and remains subject to a variety of interpretations, it underpins much of the existing 
regional security framework. This means that regional organizations, charter and treaty based, both 
comprise and are themselves bound by an increasingly complex international legal structure. This 
structure aims at the promotion of more effective global security architecture. Such architecture may 
be imperfect and still in the making but regionalism is clearly one central component, as highlighted in 
a recent interview that current UN Secretary General Ban-ki Moon gave to the World Policy 
Journal:
58
 
“Whenever some conflict happens, we depend first of all upon the initial reaction with measures 
taken by regional or sub-regional organizations, like in the case of Somalia, or in the case of Mali, 
the African Union, or ECOWAS [the Economic Community of West African States]. ECOWAS 
has been taking the leadership role in this case, and of course, they have been closely coordinating 
with the United Nations together with the European Union. All these concerted efforts will be both 
effective and efficient.” 
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List of acronyms 
ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations 
AU African Union 
CIC Centre on International Cooperation 
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States 
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States 
EPC European Political Cooperation 
ESS European Security Strategy 
EU European Union  
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council 
LAS League of Arab States 
MERCOSUR Southern Cone Common Market 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty 
OAS Organization of American States 
OAU Organization of African Unity 
OIC Organization of Islamic Cooperation 
OSCE Organization of Security Cooperation in Europe 
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction 
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